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Asymmetric auctions are among the most rapidly 
growing areas in the auction literature. The potential 
benefits from improved auction efficiency are expected 
to be enormous in public procurement auctions related 
to official development projects. Entrant bidders are 
considered a key to enhance competition in an auction 
and break potential collusive arrangements among 
incumbent bidders. Asymmetric auction theory predicts 
that weak (fringe) bidders would bid more aggressively 
when they are faced with a strong (incumbent) opponent. 
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data, this paper finds that in the major infrastructure 
sectors, entrants submitted systematically aggressive bids 
in the presence of an incumbent bidder. The findings 
also show that a high concentration of incumbents 
in an auction would harm auction efficiency, raising 
procurement costs. The results suggest that auctioneers 
should encourage fringe bidders to actively participate 
in the bidding process while maintaining the quality of 
the projects. This is conducive to enhancing competitive 
circumstances in public procurements and improving 
allocative efficiency. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
 
Asymmetric auctions are among the most rapidly growing areas in the auction literature. 
Although the traditional symmetric framework has been attractive for analyzing the general 
bidding behavior in a tractable manner, it is not always applicable in practice because bidders 
are usually heterogeneous in various dimensions. The existence of weak bidders—also 
referred to as fringe or entrant bidders—is particularly important from the competition policy 
point of view. They are expected to augment the competition effect and break potential 
collusive arrangements among strong bidders—referred to as incumbent bidders.  
 
The current paper attempts to apply the basic asymmetric auction theory to actual 
procurement data from official development assistance (ODA) projects of two aid donors. In 
the context of infrastructure development assistance, the question of how fringe bidders 
behave under competitive circumstances is of particular interest for several reasons. First, 
there is always a concern about the limited competition especially in large-scale 
infrastructure procurements (Estache and Iimi, 2008a). Our data reveal that the average 
number of firms participating in an auction is about six in road and water-related 
procurement auctions. In the electricity sector, many contracts attracted only two or three 
bidders. Hence, it is an even more fundamental question whether or not fringe bidders exist 
in these procurement markets.  
 
Closely related to this, second, high market concentration in some segments of infrastructure 
has been a cause for considerable policy concern (e.g., NOA, 2007). In the repeated game 
circumstances, incumbent bidders may desire to build a reputation of being an aggressive 
bidder, which helps deter fringe bidders from entering the market. It is a challenging task for 
auctioneers to invite new entrants to the competitive bidding, while maintaining fair 
competition environment between incumbent and fringe bidders (e.g., Klemperer, 2002). But 
is there any strong or incumbent bidder in the infrastructure project markets?  
   - 3 -
Third, it is intuitively acceptable that different types of bidders—e.g., dominant and weak, or 
foreign and domestic—are involved in the procurement process for public infrastructure 
projects. They presumably have different preferences and cost (dis)advantages to implement 
infrastructure projects given their distinct experiential, technical, administrative and financial 
backgrounds. One of the evident consequences of the existing bidder heterogeneity is joint 
bidding practices, which are commonly observed in ODA projects (Estache and Iimi, 2008b). 
About 25–30 percent of total bidders rely on the joint bidding strategy. Without bidder 
asymmetry it seems unclear why firms are motivated to form a bidding coalition.
1 Moreover, 
it is shown that local firms submit systematically low bids in particular in the road and water 
sectors. However, to our best knowledge, there is no formal analysis addressing the question 
of the existence and behavior of fringe bidders in this area.  
 
Fourth, the fact that different types of bidders coexist can potentially result in an inefficient 
allocation of the object. Under an experimental setting, Andreoni, et al. (2007) show that 
even if bidders are ex ante symmetric, the asymmetry in the bidders’ knowledge about their 
rivals’ types raises procurement costs (in our context). Bidder heterogeneity and knowledge 
asymmetry about bidders’ types are almost indistinguishable in practice. In ODA 
procurement auctions, there is no consensus on the question of who is the incumbent (or 
entrant), and it is also plausible that some firms well know who their rivals are and others do 
not.  
 
Fifth, the size of contracts in infrastructure projects is usually large. In theory, as the potential 
reward increases, firms are more motivated to collude with each other. Collusion may easily 
translate into corruption. If a corrupt agent has large manipulation power, bribery makes it 
more difficult for the truly efficient bidder to secure a win (Burguet and Che, 2004). The 
alleged notion that a considerable amount of public resources including foreign aid might be 
lost due to poor governance has been among the most serious concerns in the donor 
                                                 
1 This assumes the conventional independent private value paradigm. See Estache and Iimi (2008b) for further 
details.    - 4 -
community (Olken, 2005; Auriol, 2006). The unpredicted entry of fringe bidders has an 
important role to play in mitigating collusive and corrupt incidences.  
 
Because of the size, finally, there is the high potential for efficiency gains by encouraging 
competition at the auction level. Our companion paper (Estache and Iimi, 2008a) shows that 
total benefits to developing countries could amount to 8.2 percent of annual investment 
requirements in infrastructure, if the optimal level of competition is achieved. Importantly, 
public investment resources are limited in the developing world.  
 
The key question is how the authorities can promote competition in the public procurement 
procedure for infrastructure investment. Obviously, it is not a good idea to compromise the 
prequalification requirements so that many firms without sufficient responsiveness would be 
allowed to participate in the bidding process. When some prequalification criteria are 
loosened, the winning bid will certainly decline, but a serious quality concern must be left 
behind.
2 As well documented in ADB (2006), it is important to exclude inadequately 
qualified competitors from submitting unrealistically low bids, while keeping encouraging 
local firms to participate in the competition, for instance, through forming joint ventures. 
This remains a difficult task, and therefore, it is essential to understand how weak bidders 
behave in competitive bidding provided that bidders are likely asymmetric—i.e., either 
strong or weak.  
 
Asymmetric auction theory predicts that a weaker (fringe) bidder tends to bid more 
aggressively in the presence of a strong (incumbent) bidder. Maskin and Riley (2002) shows 
that if a weak bidder faces a strong bidder rather than another weak bidder, he responds with 
a more aggressive bid distribution in the sense of stochastic dominance. Symmetrically, if a 
strong bidder faces a weak bidder rather than another strong bidder, he will respond with a 
less aggressive bid distribution. This proposition can explain the possible difference in 
bidding behavior if two types of bidders exist in an auction.  
                                                 
2 Joint bidding practices are another possibility to invite more firms to public procurement auctions (Estache 
and Iimi, 2008b).    - 5 -
 
Empirically, De Silva, et al. (2002; 2003), investigating the case of Oklahoma State’s auction 
market for road construction projects, finds that new entrants actually bid more aggressively 
than incumbents did, especially in the lower tail of the bid distribution. Of particular note, in 
their analysis only 70 entrant bids are identified out of about 2,800 bids. Moreover, a single 
firm bided 218 projects and a single firm was awarded with 59 contracts. These facts may 
characterize road construction auctions as a typical repeated game involving a closed set of a 
few incumbent bidders.  
 
On the other hand, the prediction that weak bidders tender aggressive bids may raise a 
concern about the winner’s curse (e.g., Klemperer, 1998). Executing agencies (i.e., 
auctioneers) will be faced with great difficulties when contractors of infrastructure projects 
go bankrupt or attempt to undergo renegotiation, because they are trapped in a classic hold up 
problem.
3 Theoretically, it is shown that a “high bid and broke winner” phenomenon is 
difficult to avoid (Zheng, 2001), and in reality such a problem is not rare.  
 
The current paper aims at identifying incumbent bidders somehow and estimating the impact 
of their presence in an auction on the equilibrium bid function. The remaining sections are 
organized as follows: Section II provides an overview of market concentration and the 
existence of potential fringe firms and entrant bidders in our ODA procurement data. Section 
III establishes an empirical model and describes our data. Section IV summarizes the main 
regression results and discusses several policy implications.  
 
 
II. MARKET CONCENTRATION AND FRINGE BIDDERS IN INFRASTRUCTURE PROCUREMENTS  
 
Our data initially cover 211 procurement auctions for 69 infrastructure projects in 29 
developing countries from 1997 to 2007. When the fact that any single firm can possibly 
                                                 
3 The more valuable the contract is, the difficult it is to terminate the existing contract. This is typical in large-
scale national development projects.    - 6 -
participate in more than one auction is ignored, in total 1,656 “firms” who solely or jointly 
participated are identified in these procurement auctions. With joint bidding practices 
accounted for, in total 862 “bidders” were involved in the competition process.  
 
Importantly, some firms are repeatedly participating in a series of procurement auctions in 
developing countries. Some are domestic companies, and others are multinational enterprises. 
This phenomenon is related to a market concentration question. Our sample reveals that one 
firm obtained seven road contracts solely or jointly (Table 1). In the water sector, one firm 
was awarded six public contracts related to ODA projects, though the market concentration 
looks relatively moderate compared with the other sectors. In the electricity sector where our 
sample data are quite limited, six firms won three or more contracts each.  
 
















Source: Author’s calculation.  
 
Figure 1 shows the conventional concentration ratio of the top three or five firms in each 
sector (in terms of the number of contracts awarded). While the water sector is least 
concentrated, the electricity sector is most concentrated. The concentration ratios of the top 
five firms are 13 percent and 22 percent in water and power project procurements. The ratio 
is about 15 percent in the road sector. These figures may not be significantly high, though 
they risk being underestimated; the data are by no means comprehensive in terms of coverage 
of sample countries, periods and projects. Moreover, the identification of the same firm may 
not be perfect (see Estache and Iimi (2008a; 2008b) for details).  
 
Nonetheless, it seems evident that there are a number of firms that can be characterized as 
fringe (weak) bidders in these markets. Notably, this contrasts strikingly with the concession-  - 7 -
based infrastructure market.
4 According to the PPI database, the top 10 percent largest 
firms—defined by the number of transactions that each company obtained—were awarded 
about half of the public private partnership (PPP) contracts in infrastructure over the world. 
In the water industry, for instance, a multinational French water service operator, Veolia 
Environnement (former Vivendi Environnement, or Compagnie Générale des Eaux), was 
awarded 51 contracts, and another French company, SUEZ (former Lyonnaise des Eaux), 
won 50 transactions (Iimi, 2007).
5  
 








































Source: Author’s calculation.  
 
It is debatable how to identify fringe (or incumbent) bidders in empirical works. One popular 
approach is to rely on some auction outcome measures, such as the number of wins. The 
potential problem is that the outcomes are endogenously generated. In addition, it implicitly 
assumes that the nature of being a particular type of bidder, like fringe bidders, would 
translate into such observable outcomes. For example, one might think that fringe 
incumbents would be unlikely to obtain the object. The current paper follows De Silva, et al. 
(2002; 2003) and reinforces their definition; they define entrants as firms who did not bid in 
the first half of the sample period, and use data from the second half for their main analysis. 
                                                 
4 Benitez and Estache (2005), computing the market concentration indices in the infrastructure service markets, 
show that the electricity distribution, fixed-line telecommunications and water distribution markets are over-
concentrated.  
5 Also see Foster (2005).    - 8 -
This is not a perfect solution, and especially its great disadvantage is that half observations 
are discarded. However, the idea is at least feasible and not inconsistent with theory.  
 
We define incumbent (strong) bidders as firms who obtained one or more contracts in the 
same sector during the first period: 1997–2002. This period covers about 20 percent of our 
entire sample data.
6 If a bidder is composed of multiple firms, it is defined as incumbent 
when at least one of the member firms has been awarded one or more contracts. Then, this 
definition is applied to the rest of the sample period: 2003-2007. We identify a total of 386 
fringe bidders in the second half of our sample period. This accounts for about 70 percent of 
total bidders. Approximately two third of fringe bidders are faced with an incumbent bidder 
in auctions for road and electricity project auctions. One third of entrants competed with 
incumbents for water contracts (Table 2). Table 3 presents some companies classified as an 
incumbent or constituting a consortium classified as an incumbent based on our working 
definition. Some of them somewhat represent real incumbent firms that practitioners can 
agree on. But it is clearly affected by our country selection, and thus this classification cannot 
be generalized beyond the analysis in the current paper.  
 
Table 2. Our Working Classification of Incumbent and Fringe Bidders: 2003-2007  
Roads Water Electricity
Number of auctions 45 60 33
Number of bidders 188 236 99
Of which, incumbent bidders 62 39 36
Of which, fringe bidders 126 197 63
Of which, bidders facing incumbents 71 66 38  















                                                 
6 We intended to use the minimum amount of observations to identify the types of bidders; otherwise, no robust 
estimate of the entrant or incumbent effects in question could be obtained because of our limited sample.     - 9 -
Table 3. Selected Companies Classified as “Incumbent Bidders”  
Sector Company
Roads China Road & Bridge Corporation






Water and sewage Constructora Cadena S.A. de C.V.
Summit Grade Limited, Part
Tianjin Machinery & Electric Equipment Import & Export Co. Ltd.
Urbanizacion y Riego de Baja California S.A. de C.V.
Electricity Mitsui & Co., Ltd
Alstom
China National Electric Wire & Cable Import & Export Corporation 
EnegroInvest D.D.
Itochu
Nissho Iwai Corporation  
Source: Author’s calculation.  
 
Based on definition, the probability distribution functions of normalized bids are illustrated 
(Figure 2). Incumbent bidders appear more aggressive than fringe bidders do, in particular in 
road procurements. Incumbents seem to have a tendency to submit competitive bids in the 
electricity sector as well. Note that these figures are unconditional and just compare bid 
prices by entrant and incumbent firms. It is worth recalling that theory does not indicate how 
differently they bid. Rather, it predicts that weak bidders tend to be more aggressive only if 
they are faced with strong opponents (Maskin and Riley, 2002).  
 
Figure 2. Probability Distribution of Normalized Bid by Entrant and Incumbent Bidders 
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Source: Author’s calculation.    - 10 -
 
Our data are broadly supportive of the theoretical proposition. Figure 3 shows that the 
probability distributions of entrant bids only. While the distributions conditional on the 
existence of incumbent bidder(s) in an auction are shown in the upper charts, those 
conditional on the absence of incumbent(s) are shown in the lower charts. Except for the 
water sector, it seems that fringe bidders respond with aggressive bids when they compete 
against incumbent bidders in that auction. Especially in electricity procurement auctions, the 
probability distribution is concentrated on the left hand side, if one or more incumbents are 
present.  
 
Figure 3. Probability Distribution of Normalized Fringe Bids  
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Source: Author’s calculation.  
 
Figure 4 shows the cumulative probability distribution functions of entrant bids. The 
electricity sector exhibits the stochastic dominance of entrant bids in the presence of 
incumbent firms, as expected by Maskin and Riley (2002). In road procurements, entrant bids 
with incumbent rival’s presence may partly dominate those without incumbents, but it cannot 
be applied to the entire range of observed bids. The water sector looks inconsistent with 
theory; however, these comparisons are informal; there are many uncontrolled factors, some 
of which are accounted for in the following sections.    - 11 -
 
Figure 4. Cumulative Probability Distribution of Fringe Bids  
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Source: Author’s calculation.  
 
 
III. THE EMPIRICAL MODEL AND DATA  
 
The empirical model is based on our companion paper (Estache and Iimi, 2008a). The 
following equilibrium bid function is estimated:  
 
it t t i t it incumbent w Faced i Fringe it N X PastWin ShrInc D D b ε γ β α α α α + + + + + + = ln ' 4 3 )     ( 2 ) ( 1  
 
bit is i’s bid amount at auction t. The dependent variable includes both winning and losing 
bids, since the auction format adopted in ODA projects is a first-price sealed-bid auction. To 
save the degree of freedom, some of the explanatory variables, including a number of bidder 
nationality dummy variables, are excluded from our original model (Estache and Iimi, 2008a). 
Recall that our sample size is shrunken in order to define incumbent and entrant bidders. 
However, the contract-specific variables included in Xt are generally the same. Nt is the 
number of bidders participating in auction t, which is a key proxy to control for the degree of 
competition in an auction.  
 
Following De Silva, et al. (2003), four variables are introduced to test the entrant bidding 
behavior predicted by asymmetric auction theory. First of all, D(Fringe) is set at one if bidder i 
is classified as an entrant; the dummy variable is expected to capture an unobserved 
characteristic of entrant bidders. Despite the presence of incumbent bidders, entrants may   - 12 -
share certain common characteristics of cost parameters. For instance, in the highway 
construction case, De Silva et al. (2003) found that entrant bids are systematically low 
regardless of whether or not incumbent bidders are there. However, this may not always be 
the case if entrants are apparently inefficient and barely participate in the bidding 
competition.  
 
Importantly, the entrant dummy is not our key parameter to be tested. Based on theory, it is 
the impact of the presence of incumbent firms on entrant aggressiveness, which is measured 
by another dummy variable denoted by D(Faced w incumbent). If it has a negative coefficient, it 
means that entrant bidders who are faced with incumbent rivals do respond aggressively, 
supporting the theoretical proposition.  
 
We use two more variables related to the asymmetry across bidders. One is the number of 
contracts obtained by each bidder in the pre-period, i.e., 1997–2002. If a bidder is composed 
of more than one firm, all figures of the member firms are added up. This proxy is supposed 
to capture the potential differences in efficiencies across bidders (De Silva, et al., 2003). 
Firms with more prior-winning experience may be able to be presumed more efficient, 
whence continuing to submit low bids. Another is the share of incumbent bidders in each 
auction. This is additional to the existing literature but basically expected to play the same 
role as the measure of rivals’ competitiveness, such as the past average winning ratio used by 
De Silva, et al. (2003). However, particular attention is paid to the extent to which 
presumably strong incumbents participate in each auction by using the incumbent 
concentration variable. The concern over anti-competitiveness will heighten, as the 
concentration of incumbent bidders increases in an auction.  
 
Table 4 presents the summary statistics of the data used for our regression analysis. The data 
are comparable with the original one (see Estache and Iimi, 2008a) but cover only the period: 
2003–2007. Of particular note, 67 percent of bidders are considered entrant in road 
procurements. In the water sector, this is as high as 83 percent. By contrast, the entrant ratio 
is lowest at 64 percent for the electricity projects. The share of incumbent bidders per auction   - 13 -
is estimated at 32 percent in the road sector. The electricity sector has the similar level of 
incumbent bidders’ presence (36 percent). In the water sector, however, the concentration of 
incumbent bidders is relatively low at 16 percent.  
 
Based on our division of the sample period, bidders seem to have been awarded only a few 
contracts on average. The sample mean is 0.6 contracts in the road sector. This is the highest 
among the three sectors. The reason is simply that the total number of contracts in our pre-
period is largest. The average numbers of past contracts are only 0.2 and 0.27 in the water 
and electricity sectors, respectively.  
 
Table 4. Summary Statistics  
Obs. Coef.  Std.Dev. Min Max
Roads
Bid amount (million US$) 188 27.02 22.27 2.03 144.38
D (Fringe bidder) 188 0.67 0.47 0 1
D (Fringe bidder facing incumbents) 188 0.38 0.49 0 1
Share of incumbents in that auction 188 0.32 0.31 0 1
Number of contracts awarded 188 0.60 1.04 0 4
Number of bidders 188 6.63 3.75 2 16
Total road length (km) 188 43.27 60.89 3.50 427.00
Number of lanes 188 2.84 1.16 1 6
D (New roads) 188 0.53 0.50 0 1
D (Rehabilitation work) 188 0.37 0.48 0 1
Contract duration (month) 188 33.80 9.81 11.00 48.00
Water and sewage
Bid amount (million US$) 236 15.95 26.61 0.33 276.66
D (Fringe bidder) 236 0.83 0.37 0 1
D (Fringe bidder facing incumbents) 236 0.28 0.45 0 1
Share of incumbents in that auction 236 0.16 0.24 0 1
Number of contracts awarded 236 0.22 0.68 0 4
Number of bidders 236 6.36 3.81 2 16
D (Water) 236 0.27 0.44 0 1
D (Treatment plant) 236 0.45 0.50 0 1
D (Network) 236 0.60 0.49 0 1
Treatment capacity (million m3) 236 0.10 0.18 0 0.60
Total concrete tunnel length (km) 236 0.33 2.32 0 24.85
Total iron pipe length (km) 236 36.11 56.59 0 258.70
Contract duration (month) 236 26.11 13.03 3.00 72.00
Electricity
Bid amount (million US$) 99 51.97 71.89 0.22 435.49
D (Fringe bidder) 99 0.64 0.48 0 1
D (Fringe bidder facing incumbents) 99 0.38 0.49 0 1
Share of incumbents in that auction 99 0.36 0.29 0 1
Number of contracts awarded 99 0.27 0.71 0 3
Number of bidders 99 4.71 2.38 2 12
D (Generator) 99 0.26 0.44 0 1
D (Trans. lines) 99 0.21 0.41 0 1
D (Substation) 99 0.34 0.48 0 1
D (Civil work) 99 0.68 0.47 0 1
Installed capacity (MW) 99 69.47 193.50 0 1,200
Number of generators  99 1.36 3.12 0 12
Transmission line capacity (kV) 99 32.03 94.52 0 500.00
Total transmission line length (km) 99 20.59 55.92 0 230.00
Contract duration (month) 99 27.28 12.19 3.00 48.00 
Source: Author’s calculation.    - 14 -
 
IV. ESTIMATION RESULTS  
 
Tables 5 to 7 present our main regression results in the three sectors. The estimated 
parameters are not significantly different from those in Estache and Iimi (2008a), despite 
differences in their data coverage and specifications. Competition generally matters, though 
the coefficient associated with the number of bidders tends to be insignificant with data from 
the electricity sector. In addition, the larger the scale of the project, the higher the revealed 
equilibrium bids. For instance, a longer road work will cost more, as expected. If a treatment 
plant with larger water production capacity is constructed, the submitted bids will be higher 
systematically. The equilibrium bids also increase with electricity generation and 
transmission capacities.  
 
The most important finding is that entrant bidders faced with incumbent bidder(s) have been 
found aggressive, regardless of sector. The coefficient of the dummy variables for entrant 
bids in the presence of incumbent bidder(s) is significant and negative in all sectors. The 
coefficient is estimated at -3.9 in road procurement auctions, meaning that a fringe bidder is 
predicted to respond with a 3.9 million U.S. dollar lower bid if he is competing against some 
incumbent bidders, holding everything else constant. The magnitude of the coefficient varies 
across sector. The coefficient tends to increase particularly in the electricity sector, partially 
because the contract amount is normally large in this sector. All coefficients are statistically 
different from zero, supporting the hypothesis that there are two types of bidders: incumbent 
(strong) and entrant (weak), and entrant bids are aggressive given the presence of incumbents.  
 
A policy implication of this is twofold. First, encouraging fringe bidders to participate in the 
bidding process might be conducive to reducing procurement costs in infrastructure 
projects.
7 As far as our data are concerned, the above provides the insight that a considerable 
                                                 
7 There is an adverse effect predicted as the flip side of the same coin by asymmetric auction theory. Incumbent 
bidders are likely to respond less aggressively when they are faced with entrant bidders. This would mitigate the 
competition pressure in auctions, and the net impact will be ambiguous.    - 15 -
number of firms who can be characterized as fringe bidders. However, second, they tend to 
exhibit aggressive behavior in bidding. Normally several incumbent bidders are expected be 
present in a competition.
8 Then, the “low bid and broke winner” concern will emerge. It is 
important to establish a sound selection mechanism, e.g., prequalification and two-stage 
evaluation of prices and technical attributes, to exclude firms who are unlikely to deliver th
reasonable quality
e 
 of work.  
                                                
 
Contrary to prior expectations, there is no statistically significant evidence that entrant 
bidders are less efficient or less inefficient than incumbents. In the electricity industry, 
entrants seem have the disadvantage, because one of the coefficients is significantly positive. 
This may be reasonable with the advanced technical nature required by the sector taken into 
account.  
 
The number of contracts obtained by each bidder in the past has negative coefficients across 
sectors, meaning that firms who received prior procurement awards are likely to be efficient 
enough to submit low bids. In the last column model with water project procurement data, 
the coefficient turns out statistically significant. This is good news and bad news. It can be 
interpreted to mean that the past auctions achieved the efficient allocation. The contractors 
who had been selected were actually efficient as far as their bidding behavior in the 
subsequent period is considered. Bad news is this: the result suggests that past contractors are 
likely to be awarded repeatedly, making it difficult to invite new entrant bidders. However, 
once they decide to participate in the bidding process, they have a tendency toward 
aggressive bidding.  
 
Finally, high concentration of incumbent bidders in an auction has an adverse effect on 
efficiency. The coefficient of the share of incumbents is consistently positive and very 
significant. This indicates the classical risk of anticompetitive behavior among market 
 
8 It is noteworthy that the relatively low market concentration of incumbent bidders measured by our measure of 
the share of incumbents in each auction is subject to our tentative incumbent definition assumed for the 
analytical work. However, as mentioned, it is open to discussion who is the incumbent.    - 16 -
dominants. It could be caused by explicit and implicit collusion; importantly, it may be 
realized in equilibrium given the rules of the game. To remove this anticompetitive effect 
associated with incumbents’ dominance, again, it is important to promote active entrant 
participation in the auctions. Note that this effect is only associated with incumbent bidders. 
Conversely, the above-mentioned effect captured by the number past contracts is symmetric 
between incumbent and entrant firms. 
 
In sum, some of the direct policy implications are as follows:  
 
  A number of firms may be considered entrant or fringe bidders in infrastructure 
procurement auctions.  
  They may or may not be efficient.  
  However, they are expected to bid aggressively in the presence of incumbent bidders, 
whence promoting competition and possibly reducing procurement costs.  
  When their aggressive behavior raises a concern about the “low ball” problem, 
auctioneers are required to follow a sound selection mechanism using the 
prequalification and/or two-stage evaluation procedures.  
  High concentration of incumbent bidders in an auction also harms auction efficiency, 
raising procurement costs. 
  From this perspective, again, it is important to encourage fringe bidders to actively 
participate in the bidding process and maintain competitive circumstances in public 
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Table 5. Regression Results for Bids in Road Procurements  
(1) (2) (3)
Entrant bid dummy 3.62 7.17
(4.27) (4.55)
Dummy for entrant facing with incumbent(s) -3.90
*
(2.12)



















































Obs. 188 188 188
R-squared 0.680 0.727 0.730
F-statistics 90.15 68.21 65.71
1/ For presentation purposes, the coefficients are multiplied by 1,000. 
Note: The dependent variable is the bidding amount. The robust standard errors are shown 
in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.  
Source: Author’s calculation.  
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Table 6. Regression Results for Bids in Water Project Procurements  
OLS OLS OLS
Entrant bid dummy -2.04 17.83
(7.59) (11.68)
Dummy for entrant facing with incumbent(s) -22.52
**
(9.92)



























ln(Tunnel network length) 0.24 0.52 0.30
(0.44) (0.37) (0.42)

















Obs. 236 236 236
R-squared 0.360 0.400 0.422
F-statistics 15.39 14.05 11.25
Note: The dependent variable is the bidding amount. The robust standard errors are shown 
in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.  
Source: Author’s calculation.    - 19 -
Table 7. Regression Results for Bids in Electricity Project Procurements  
OLS OLS OLS
Entrant bid dummy 1/ -0.05 1.69
***
(0.11) (0.39)
Dummy for entrant facing with incumbent(s) 1/ -1.72
***
(0.39)




Number of contracts before 2002 -6.36 -4.31
(9.46) (6.57)







Trans. dist. lines 8.13 11.83 -35.48
**
(15.40) (14.81) (15.40)













Number of turbines 1.62 1.43 8.25
***
(3.36) (3.30) (1.96)



















Obs. 99 99 99
R-squared 0.545 0.580 0.749
F-statistics 32.74 25.27 37.90
1/ For presentation purposes, the coefficients are divided by 100. 
Note: The dependent variable is the bidding amount. The robust standard errors are shown 
in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.  
Source: Author’s calculation.  
 
 
V. CONCLUSION   
 
Asymmetric auctions are among the most rapidly growing areas in the auction literature. The 
traditional symmetric framework is not always applicable in practice because bidders are 
usually heterogeneous.  
 
In public procurement auctions related to official development projects, an alleged concern is 
that the competition pressures at the auctions might be relatively weak. The potential benefits 
from improved auction efficiency are expected to be enormous.  
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Entrant bidders are considered a key to enhance competition in an auction and break potential 
collusive arrangements among incumbent bidders. However, it is debatable whether or not 
fringe bidders exist in these infrastructure procurement markets. It may also be open to 
argument how to identify fringe (or incumbent) bidders in empirical works.  
 
Asymmetric auction theory predicts that weak (fringe) bidders would bid more aggressively 
when they are faced with a strong (incumbent) opponent. Our ODA procurement data are 
supportive of this. It has been found that in the three infrastructure sectors, entrant bidders 
submitted systematically aggressive bids in the presence of incumbent bidders. It is also 
shown that high concentration of incumbents in an auction would be likely to harm auction 
efficiency, raising procurement costs. 
 
The results suggest that auctioneers should encourage fringe bidders to actively participate in 
the bidding process while maintaining the quality of the projects to be delivered. It would be 
conducive to enhancing competitive circumstances in public procurement auctions and 
improving procurement efficiency.  
   - 21 -
REFERENCE  
 
ADB. 2006. Standard Prequalification Document: Prequalification of Bidders User’s Guide. 
Asian Development Bank.  
Auriol, Emmanuelle. 2006. Corruption in procurement and public purchase. International 
Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 24, pp. 867-885.  
Bailey, Elizabeth. 2007. Are private equity consortia anticompetitive? The economics of club 
bidding. The Antitrust Source, Vol. 6(4), pp. 1-8.  
Benitez, Daniel, Antonio Estache. 2005. How concentrated are global infrastructure markets? 
Policy Research Working Paper Series No. 3513, The World Bank. 
Burguet, Roberto, Yeon-Koo Che. 2004. Competitive procurement with corruption. Rand 
Journal of Economics, Vol. 35, pp. 50-68.  
De Silva, Dakshina, Timothy Dunne, Georgia Kosmopoulou. 2002. Sequential bidding in 
auctions of construction contracts. Economics Letters, Vol. 76, pp. 239-244.  
De Silva, Dakshina, Timothy Dunne, Georgia Kosmopoulou. 2003. An empirical analysis of 
entrant and incumbent bidding in road construction auctions. The Journal of 
Industrial Economics, Vol. 51, pp. 295-316.   
Foster, Vivien. 2005. Ten years of water service reforms in Latin America: toward an Anglo-
French model. Water Supply and Sanitation Sector Board Discussion Paper Series 
No. 3, The World Bank.  
Estache, Antonio, Atsushi Iimi. 2008a. Procurement efficiency for infrastructure 
development and financial needs reassessed. Mimeograph.  
Estache, Antonio, Atsushi Iimi. 2008b. Joint bidding in infrastructure procurement. 
Mimeograph.  
Geene, William. 1997. Econometric Analysis. Prentice Hall: New Jersey.  
Gupta, Srabana. 2002. Competition and collusion in a government procurement auction 
market. Atlantic Economic Journal, Vol. 30, pp. 13-25.  
Hendricks, Kenneth, Robert Porter. 1992. Joint bidding in Federal OCS auctions. The 
American Economic Review, Vol. 82, pp. 506-511. 
Hoffman, Elizabeth, James Marsden, Reze Saidi. 1991. Are joint bidding and competitive 
common value auction market compatible? Some evidence from offshore oil auctions. 
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Vol. 20, pp. 99-112.  
Iimi, Atsushi. 2004. (Anti-)Competitive effect of joint bidding: evidence from ODA 
procurement auctions. Journal of The Japanese and International Economies, Vol. 18, 
pp. 416-439.  
Iimi, Atsushi. 2006. Auction reforms for effective official development assistance. Review of 
Industrial Organization, Vol. 28, pp. 109-128.    - 22 -
Iimi, Atsushi. 2007. Applied auction theory for PPP transactions: basic theory and some 
evidence. Mimeograph.  
Klemperer, Paul. 1998. Auctions with almost common values: the “wallet game” and its 
applications. European Economic Review, Vol. 42, pp. 757-769.  
Klemperer, Paul. 2002. How (not) to run auctions: the European 3G telecom auctions. 
European Economic Review, Vol. 46, pp. 829-845.  
 
Maskin, Eric, and John Riley. 2000. Asymmetric auctions. The Review of Economic Studies, 
Vol. 67, pp. 413-438.  
Moody, C.E., W.J. Kruvant. 1988. Joint bidding, entry, and the price of OCS leases. RAND 
Journal of Economics, Vol. 19, pp. 276-284.  
NOA. 2007. Improving the PFI Tendering Process. The National Audit Office.  
Olken, Benjamin. 2005. Monitoring corruption: evidence from a field experiment in 
Indonesia. NBER Working Paper Series 11753.  
Porter, Robert, Douglas Zona. 1993. Detection of bid rigging in procurement auctions. 
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 101, pp. 518-538.   
Zheng, Charles. 2001. High bids and broke winners. Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 100, 
pp. 129-171.  
 
 